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Introduction  
Since the Second World War, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the major 
players in the field of international economics and international relations. Besides its task to 
facilitate the functioning of the global economy, one of its main roles is lending to countries 
in economic problems. However, there have been various critiques on the effectiveness of 
these lending programmes by the IMF (Vreeland 2006). In many cases it seems that the 
economic situation of borrowing countries did not improve or even worsened after the 
implementation of reforms advised by the IMF (Dreher 2004). It is not clear however 
whether the lack of improvement is due to bad advice by the IMF or because of an 
incomplete implementation of the reforms (Bird 1998).  In order to solve this issue it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the compliance rate with conditions and the 
content of those specific conditions. If countries do not comply with a specific condition it is 
not possible to say anything about the quality of advice that underlies that condition.
 However, debate still remains regarding the question why countries do not comply 
with the conditions imposed by the IMF. Is it because they cannot do so, because conditions 
are too stringent, or do they not want to comply? Various models have been proposed 
(Joyce 2003) but it is not yet clear which one has the most explanatory power. In addition, 
most of the research that has been done relies on cross-country evidence and uses an 
aggregate index of compliance which does not differentiate between different types of 
conditions. It is also largely quantitative, employing regression models that consider a 
variety of mainly economic variables, or standardized factors.1 While these methods can be 
very useful, they do not take into account the specific contextual factors that could play a 
role. Therefore, this paper takes a qualitative approach instead, investigating the research 
question: What does a qualitative analysis reveal about the reasons for non-compliance with 
IMF conditionality in PRGF programmes?         
 To answer this question case studies are used, which are investigated with the 
method of controlled comparison. The cases that are examined are Tanzania and Kenya, two 
developing countries in the same region and with a similar colonial history. Both countries 
were involved in a PRGF programme between 2003 and 2007, but their extent of compliance 
differed. While it is important to consider the caveat of only two cases, the fact that this is 
                                                          
1
 For example, there exists a code for democracy or no democracy, but subtleties with regard to the type of 
democracy are lost 
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the first paper that does a qualitative analysis of the reports of the programme itself,  
implies that these cases can nevertheless provide important insights. Moreover, the relevant 
factors revealed by this analysis are also identified by general theories of compliance,  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides a brief review of the 
general literature on compliance and discusses the main authors of the literature on 
compliance with the IMF. It concludes with a description of the methodology and case 
studies that were used. Chapter 2 provides some background information on the IMF and 
the PRGF arrangement. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the findings of each case study. These 
findings are discussed in chapter 5, while the final section concludes by providing a 
summary, discussing the implications and considering some issues for future research.  
1. Literature Review  
The literature on compliance within the field of IR is large. It varies from a general 
perspective on the question why countries adopt and comply with certain rules, to specific 
studies on the effect of one variable on the level of compliance with a certain agreement. 
Nevertheless, most of the literature can be roughly divided into two approaches: the 
rationalist approach and the constructivist approach (Checkel 2001; Risse 2000). Within 
these approaches, a distinction can be made between scholars that treat a country, or a 
government as a single unit, and scholars that consider the variety of actors that play a role 
in the decision-making of governments. Sometimes these latter are treated as a separate 
approach: the domestic politics approach (Underdal 1998; Simmons 1998, Raustalia 2000). 
Most literature seems to agree on the fact that domestic politics do have an influence on 
compliance (Gourevitch 2002: 407, Haas 1997:21), however some authors approach this 
from a rationalist position and others from a constructivist position.   
 This section starts by describing the main characteristics of the rationalist and 
constructivist approach. Subsequently, the most important literature focused on compliance 
with conditions imposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) will be discussed. The 
section concludes with a description of the methodology used in this thesis.  
1.1 The rationalist approach 
Regarding the rationalist approach there are two main assumptions: 1) states are rational, 
interdependent decision-making actors;  and 2) options are evaluated only in terms of costs 
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and benefits (Underdahl 1998, Hurd 1999, Raustalia 2000). These costs and benefits need 
not be material, they can also be non-material. An example of non-material costs are 
reputational concerns (Raustalia 2000). With respect to the evaluation of these costs and 
benefits, Hurd distinguishes between situations of self-restraint, in which the pursuit of self-
interest plays a major role, and situations of coercion, in which an external restraint is the 
reason behind a certain decision (1999: 386). This rationalist problem structure shows why 
and how many international agreements try to include an incentive or punitive measures for 
non-compliance (Raustalia 2000: 403).        
 An advantage of the rationalist approach is its easy applicability to real-life issues and 
its large explanatory power (Underdahl 1998, Thompson 2002). An important critique to this 
approach however, is that it assumes that decisions are made by unitary actors, while in 
reality most decision-makers in international politics are aggregate actors, such as  states 
and international organizations (Killick 1997:488). This implies that it is either assumed that 
all individual preferences are aggregated into the state’s preferences, or that state decision-
making is made by a single group (Thompson 2002). This is where the relevance of the 
literature on domestic politics becomes clear, since this strand of literature aims to explain 
how the preferences (and consequently decisions) of a state can be clarified, by looking at 
the domestic (political) situation.  
1.2 The constructivist approach 
The constructivist approach on the other hand, focuses on the ideational rather than the 
structural basis of policy. It marginalizes the role of interests and power as the main 
determinant of compliance. Alternatively, interests and power are considered to be based 
on ideas and knowledge (Underdahl 1998: 20). Furthermore, this approach considers the 
social construction of a state’s interests: it aims to explain how preferences and interests are 
formed (Ruggie 1998, Raustalia 2000). According to Ruggie (1998), the main contribution of 
the constructivist approach, lies in its recognition of the influence of ideas through 
interaction.           
 Another important characteristic of the constructivist approach is its focus on a 
process of socialization (Raustalia 2000, Ruggie 1998, Hurd 1999) . Hurd argues that a state 
may comply with a rule because it considers this rule legitimate. In this case there is no 
calculation of self-interest but rather a sense of moral obligation. To achieve this perception 
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of legitimacy, a process of socialization is needed. Hurd describes this process as follows: 
’the operative process in legitimization is the internalization by the actor of an external 
standard’(1999: 388). Checkel’s work (1997, 2001,2005) also focuses on this concept of 
socialization. He argues that compliance with international norms can sometimes be 
explained as a rational choice, but in later stages often becomes embedded in the identity of 
decision-makers. From this perspective, the rationalist and constructivist approach can be 
distinguished based on their underlying logic. Rationalism uses a logic of consequences, 
while the constructivist approach assumes a logic of appropriateness (Checkel 1998, Fearon 
and Wendt 2002). Checkel’s process of socialization incorporates aspects from both 
approaches, and thereby decreases the ideational gap between the two. He aims to 
synthesize the different methods, arguing they both offer valuable insights (1998: 488). 
 Checkel is not the only scholar that aims to combine both approaches. It is 
increasingly recognized that the approaches need not be mutually exclusive, but are 
complementary to each other (Fearon and Wendt 2002, Simmons 1998). The different 
approaches focus on different aspects of the compliance problem. This implies that their 
insights can be combined to improve our understanding of compliance (Underdal 1998: 23).  
1.3 Compliance imposed by IFIs 
The previous scholars examined compliance with international rules in general. Since this 
paper deals with compliance with conditions imposed by the IMF, this section discusses the 
literature that specifically focuses on compliance with conditions imposed by IFIs.   
 The majority of the literature investigating conditionality of the IFIs, aims to explain 
why states do or do not comply with conditions they initially agreed with (Bird 1998, 2002, 
Killick 1997, Simmons 2000). Bird and Killick both take a rationalist approach, focusing on the 
costs and benefits of (non)compliance as the main determinant for the decision to comply or 
not. They underline the importance of ownership: the larger the degree of ownership, the 
smaller the gap between the preferred policy of the borrowing government and the 
preference of the IFI (Bird 1998: 104). The same argument is made by Mayer and 
Mourmouras, who point out that ownership need not only refer to willingness to carry  out 
reforms, but can also refer to the capacity and political ability to do so (2008: 117). Bird also 
points out the time-inconsistency problem of conditionality: most benefits of an IMF 
programme come with the announcement, while most costs occur during implementation 
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(Bird 1998: 104). Often the amount of costs only becomes clear when reforms are 
implemented, meaning non-compliance does not have to be on purpose (1998: 105). To 
improve compliance, Bird and Killick both argue that stronger incentives ánd punishments 
are needed.           
 Simmons argues that international rules ‘do alter governments’ interests in compliant 
behavior’ (2000: 819) and finds that reputational concerns are a major explanatory factor of 
compliance. She identifies regional standards of behavior regarding compliance, and explains 
how these regional standards alter the costs of non-compliance: ‘non-compliance is much 
less costly for a particular government if many others are also in violation’ (ibid:822). Her 
explanation describes a rational socialization process, combining insights from both 
rationalism and constructivism.         
 While the above-mentioned scholars do take into account the importance of the 
domestic political situation, Dreher (2003a, 2004) goes a step further by looking at the 
influence of IMF programmes on elections in borrowing countries. He finds that 
governments that complete an IMF programme twelve months before elections take place, 
in most cases increases their probability of re-election, but that this probability decreases if 
GDP growth is rising.         
 Besides articles that aim to explain (non)compliance, there is an interesting range of 
articles that investigates whether IMF programmes have a catalytic effect on the inflow of 
private capital (Edwards 2005, Jensen 2004, Bird and Rowlands 2002). This is an important 
issue since the IMF claims that the conditionality of its borrowing programmes have catalytic 
effects (Edwards 2005). This would mean that countries that are borrowing from the IMF are 
more likely to receive inflows of capital, in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
empirical evidence is mixed however. Bird and Rowlands review a range of empirical 
evidence and conclude that it is difficult to say whether an IMF programme will have a 
positive, negative or insignificant result (2002). Of course, it also depends on how one looks 
at it. Edwards finds evidence which suggests that an average state which is involved in an 
IMF programme experiences less outflow of portfolio investment than similar states which 
are not involved (2005:863). Jensen (2004) on the other hand, looks at capital inflows and 
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finds that countries that sign an agreement with the IMF attract 25% less FDI inflows than 
countries that do not sign an agreement.2 Comparing the starting point of both scholars, 
Edwards point is that similar countries are less worse off under an IMF programme than 
those that are not. Jensen on the other hand, points out that the claim by the IMF that 
signing an agreement with the IMF leads to more capital inflow, is incorrect.   
 Finally, there are a number of scholars presenting evidence of US influence on IMF 
programmes (Steinwand and Stone 2008, Dreher 2007, Stone 2007). More specifically, they 
find evidence of US influence on the number of conditions imposed on borrower countries. 
Stone also finds evidence that countries who receive US aid are more likely to be offered a 
programme (2008: 616). These are important findings, because they call into question the 
independence and autonomy of the IMF.       
  To conclude a few observations can be made.  First of all, it is clear that although the 
general theories of compliance seem to move away from an exclusive rationalist approach, 
most of the empirical research employed in these articles still makes use of rationalist 
frameworks. This is consistent with Ruggie’s observation upon the applicability of this 
approach (1998). Furthermore, almost all scholars now acknowledge the important role the 
domestic (political) situation plays in compliance. Finally, most research is quantitative 
rather than qualitative: almost all scholars employ regression models that make use of panel 
data and focus on economic variables. This might be a logical consequence of the first  point.  
1.4 Methodology  
As the previous section described, most research that has been done so far, is of a 
quantitative rather than qualitative nature.  However, qualitative research allows for 
analysing both the ‘visible’ factors and the invisible ones. The relation between a borrowing 
country and the IMF for instance,  would not easily emerge from numbers, but by analysing 
the tone of correspondence and reports, one can identify how this might influence the 
choice for (non)compliance. In quantitative research, that is mostly using regression models 
and large panel-data, it is necessary to predetermine the variables one wants to investigate. 
Considering that there is not yet a full theory of (non)compliance, it is useful to start with 
                                                          
2 Both scholars control for factors that lead countries to seek IMF support.  
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inductive research, using existing primary sources to find out which factors are most 
important. Moreover, regression models usually do not allow to take into account specific 
local political circumstances, while all existing literature agrees on the importance of these. 
Therefore, this thesis uses case studies to develop an explanation of the reasons for 
(non)compliance. According to van Evera, case studies are better at explaining how an 
independent variable causes the dependent variable to change (1997:54). Furthermore, a 
case study offers the possibility to do a deep qualitative analysis of the complex processes at 
work: ‘Case studies are one of the best bridges from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream 
deductive research.’ (Eisenhard & Graebner 2007:25). The case studies of this paper consist 
of two countries, Kenya and Tanzania. These countries were chosen because they were both 
involved in a PRGF programme during the period 2003-2007, but with a different extent of 
compliance. To limit the number of external factors that could influence (non)compliance, 
the countries that were chosen have a similar colonial history and lie in the same region.
 The case studies will be investigated using the method of controlled comparison, 
more specifically structured focused comparison. This method uses the commonly known 
method of difference, but emphasizes the importance of structuring the investigation of 
each case study. The structuring can be achieved by formulating a range of standardized 
general  questions to direct the examination of each case (George and McKeon 1985: 42). 
 The main source for the analysis are the official reviews of the PRGF programmes, 
written by the borrowing governments and the staff of the IMF. In addition, the discussion 
refers to some policy documents of the borrowing countries themselves, to support the 
results of the analysis based on the IMF documents. These sources are all listed in the 
references.  
2. The IMF and the PRGF  
2.1  The IMF 
The IMF was established in 1945 as a framework for international economic cooperation. It 
was designed to  prevent a repetition of the economic policies that led to the Great 
Depression during the 1930s. On the official website the objectives of the IMF are described 
as follows:  
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‘The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization of 188 countries, working to 
foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, 
promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around 
the world.’ 
There have been various critiques on the IMF during its entire existence.  Many of the initial 
critiques are still here today.  One of the oldest critiques focuses on the extent of autonomy 
of  the IMF.  These critics argue that the Fund should not be considered an autonomous 
institution but instead represents the interests of the most powerful states (Stone 
2008:592). This view is based on the way decision-making within the IMF is organized. Every  
member country is assigned a quota which reflects the size of its economy relative to other 
member countries. These quota then determine how much voting power a member country 
gets, as well as the maximum amount they can borrow and access to other IMF services.3 
Effectively, this means that richer countries have more influence on IMF policies than poorer 
countries and thereby the governance structure can be said to simply reflect the distribution 
of power (Krasner 1985). The IMF itself is clearly aware of the implications of this way of 
governance. Recently the Fund decided to rebalance the assignment of quotas in order to 
make sure that these reflect their actual size in the world economy. Furthermore, the 
number of basic votes was increased to ensure some level of participation in the decision-
making by poorer countries (IMF 2013a)         
 A second critique concerns the soundness of its policy advice.  It is argued that the 
IMF prescribes the same policy to a variety of countries which find themselves in  very 
different contexts (Stiglitz 2002, Feldstein 1998: 29). This often results in disappointing 
results, not only in terms of economic recovery but also in terms of increasing poverty   
(Stiglitz 2002). Furthermore, a third critique focuses on the way specific (liberal) economic 
policies are imposed on countries with functioning democratic governments (Feldstein 1998: 
28). Finally, critics point out that the excessive use of conditionality in IMF borrowing 
progress does not contribute to, and could even hinder economic growth (Goldstein 2001: 
9). This last critique has been recognized by the IMF itself as well, by introducing an initiative 
to streamline conditionality (Stone 2008: 598).  
                                                          
3
 An example is the share in allocation of special drawing rights: a reserve currency created by the IMF 
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2.2 The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)  
The PRGF was established in November 1999, to replace the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), as a means to prioritise the objectives of poverty reduction and 
economic growth in the provision of loans to the poorest member countries.  Therefore, 
lending programmes under the PRGF are designed around Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) in which a country describes its long-term strategy and policies to reduce 
poverty. PRSPs are created by the government of a specific country, but the government is  
required to use a participatory approach in which both domestic stakeholders and external 
development partners take place.  Moreover,  the IMF and World Bank always respond to a 
PRSP (progress report) with a Joint Staff Advisory Note (JSAN) in which they provide 
feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of the outlined strategy and propose 
recommendations. This way they can influence the proposed strategies to some extent.  
A request for a loan under the PRGF is submitted by a country’s government along with a 
Letter of Intent (LoI), and a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) which 
describes the policies to be implemented under the programme. The MEFP also includes 
quantitative and structural performance criteria, indicative targets (quantitative) and 
structural benchmarks, which are set after consultations between the country’s authorities 
and the IMF. Performance criteria need to be met in order to complete a review and thus 
the disbursement of a subsequent tranche of the loan. If a performance criterion is not met, 
a formal waiver needs to be requested to the Executive Board of the IMF to enable 
completion of the review. Generally, the IMF states it will only grant waivers if the deviation 
is small or temporary, or if the government has taken or is planning to take adjusting 
measures (IMF 2013b) Indicative targets and structural benchmarks are used to assess 
overall performance, but do not require official waivers if they are not observed. Finally, it 
should be noted that loans under the PRGF are expressed in terms of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR). SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF, whose value is based on four 
international currencies. SDR can be exchanged for any usable currency of an IMF member.  
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3. Case study 1: Tanzania   
3.1 Political background and relations with the Fund 
The United Republic of Tanzania was formed on April 26, 1964 when the former British 
Mandate Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united. Tanzania is a democracy but is generally 
considered as a one-party dominant system (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010, Morse 2013). This 
implies that there is an opposition which participates in elections but that it is highly unlikely 
that a different party than the ruling one will win (Magaloni and Kricheli: 124).  The ruling 
party in Tanzania has been the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) since 1995. Observers do not 
consider the CCM openly authoritarian, but instead attribute its consistent hegemony to its 
strong party structure which effectively maintains the loyalty of the elite (Morse 2013: 8). 
Furthermore, it is important to know that Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous part of Tanzania, 
meaning it has its own government. In the context of IMF programmes, the IMF therefore 
sometimes holds consultations with the Zanzibarian authorities separately.   
 Tanzania became a member of the IMF in 1962, when it gained its independence 
from Britain.4 Between 1962 and 2003, the year in which they requested the PRGF 
arrangement that is the subject of this research, they were involved in three earlier financial 
arrangements: the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in the period 1991-1994; 
and in two consecutive PRGF programmes, between 1996 and 2000. While the ESAF 
programme was not very successful, considering that less than 50% of the loan was 
disbursed, the PRGF loans were almost completely disbursed and thus imply a relatively 
large compliance with the conditionality.  
3.2 The PRGF arrangement 2003-2006 
Tanzania requested a new arrangement under the PRGF programme in August 2003. The 
government applied for a new loan to continue the economic progress, in order to reduce 
the still widely spread poverty. Furthermore, the planned reforms are considered to be in 
the area of expertise of the Fund and the approval of the Fund of new loan disbursements is 
considered important to attract other donors. They opt for a low access arrangement (10% 
of quota), to signal the improved position of the country and to emphasize the progress 
towards exiting the PRGF (IMF country report 3/238). The request, of 14 million SDR, is 
                                                          
4
 At the moment of entrance to the IMF Tanzania was still called Tanganyika 
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approved by the Executive Board of the IMF on the 28th of July, and the arrangement 
became effective on August 16, 2003.  
Table 1: 
Review                       # of spc # of spc met # of sbm # of sbm 
met 
Qpc 
1) February 
2004 
    5   All met 
2)July 2004      4   All met 
3)February 
2005 
    5   One not met 
4)July 2005     6   All met 
5)March 2006     6   All met 
6)November 
2006                                        
    5   All met 
 
 
All 
      
          13 
        
           10 
 
31 
            
           25 
 
 
Table 1 is compiled from tables in the appendices of the six PRGF reviews of Tanzania, that 
list the various structural performance criteria, structural benchmarks and quantitative 
performance criteria and the extent to which they were met. It provides a general overview 
of the extent of compliance of Tanzania. It shows that most of the structural performance 
criteria were met, as well as most of the structural benchmarks and the quantitative 
performance criteria. However, since numbers only do not provide an explanation, the next 
section analyses the reviews in more depth. The guiding questions during the analysis are 
the following: what kind of conditions did Tanzania have, and is there a pattern regarding 
the type which they did not comply with? What reasons do the authorities give for the non-
observance of a specific structural performance criteria? How does the staff from the IMF 
respond to their explanation? What other factors could play a role in the extent of 
compliance?  
3.2.1 Type of conditions 
Structural conditionality in this PRGF programme focuses on the areas of tax policy and 
administration, financial sector reform and governance. Quantitative indicative targets and 
performance criteria concern the non-accumulation of arrears, limiting the domestic 
financing to the Tanzanian government and a minimum requirement for international 
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reserves of the bank of Tanzania. Performance criteria that were not met, include: the 
submission to Parliament of a new income tax law (first review), a minimum requirement of 
international reserves (third review), and the submission to Parliament of an amendment to 
banking acts (third and fourth review).5  Given the small number of observations, there does 
not evolve a general pattern: the first criterion falls in the area of tax policy, the second is a 
macro-economic stability variable and the last one can be placed within the area of financial 
sector reform. However, all non-observed performance criteria were delayed, that is the 
required measures were implemented, but not within the time schedule that was set.  
 Structural benchmarks that were not met concern the licensing of a company for an 
export processing zone (EPZ, review 1) and the cabinet approval of a new anti-corruption 
law (review 5). All other structural benchmarks were met, although some with delay. In the 
final review, the three benchmarks that were not met, were included as new benchmarks for 
a Policy Support Instrument (PSI).  
3.2.2 Explanations for non-observance by the Tanzanian and the reaction of the IMF 
In the reviews, the explanations of the Tanzanian authorities and the comments of the IMF 
staff are clearly distinguished. With respect to the explanations that were given by the 
Tanzanian authorities for the non-observance of conditions, similarities can be found. The 
non-observance of the structural performance criteria and structural benchmarks, were all 
but one attributed to the need for more consultations with stakeholders(country report 
04/58: 29-30, country report 05/181:46). More specifically, to conclude the structural 
performance criterion on the submission to Parliament of an amendment to banking acts, 
that was not met twice, the Tanzanian government needed more time to conclude 
discussions with the Zanzibar authorities(country report 05/181:46, country report 
05/291:33).           
 Regarding the reaction of the IMF staff, no problem is made out of the non-
observance of a structural performance criterion, but the staff rather ‘expressed its 
understanding for the need to give parliament adequate time for consideration.’ (country 
report 04/58: 8) Sometimes they even appraise ‘the authorities commitment to full 
consultation with key stakeholders’ (country report 05/181:19).     
 The one structural benchmark whose non-observance was not attributed to the need 
                                                          
5
 In the third review a modification of this structural performance criteria was requested, in the fourth review 
the authorities requested a waiver because of a (second) delay 
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for longer consultations, concerns the licensing of a company for an Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) that would export to countries under the South-African Development Community 
Agreement (SADC) and thereby does not meet the earlier set requirement that only firms 
exporting under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Everything But Arms 
(EBA) are allowed this special treatment. The Tanzanian authorities defend this decision by 
arguing that  the goal of the EPZs is to strengthen Tanzania’s export performance and that 
the existence of other preferential trade agreements creates an opportunity to enhance the 
effect of EPZs (country report 04/58:9). The IMF staff accepts this decision, but underlines 
the importance of the authorities’ commitment to only license companies that export all of 
their output to prevent unfair competition on the domestic market (ibid.)  
 What is interesting about this example, is that it reveals some of the interests at 
stake. Initially the IMF set the condition that only companies exporting to Europe or the US 
are allowed to make use of an EPZ (in which taxes are substantially lower). However, 
Tanzania rightly points out the advantages of exporting to other African countries with which 
it has a preferential trade agreement.      
 Finally, the one quantitative performance criterion that was not observed concerns a 
minimum requirement of net international reserves.  The authorities explain that this was 
caused by one-off external payments and foreign exchange sales that were higher than 
budgeted. The one-off external payments include construction costs of the Bank of Tanzania 
(BoT) and the buying of debt on behalf of TANESCO6 by the government, to decrease 
TANESCO’s operating costs. The higher foreign exchange sales were mainly a result of higher 
oil prices (country report 05/181:34). Again, the authorities of the IMF do not make any 
problem out of this. They underscore the fact that the shortfall in reserves was temporary 
and that the overall position of Tanzania remained strong (country report 05/181:7).  
3.2.3 Other explanatory factors 
While the above explanations were provided by the Tanzanian authorities themselves, one 
can also reveal some other factors that play a role in the decision to comply. One of the most 
obvious ones is the influence of donors, which is mentioned in five of the six reports, both by 
                                                          
6
 TANESCO is the Tanzania Electric Supply Company, this company relies largely on hydropower and is 
consequently very  vulnerable to droughts: to ensure continued access to electricity, the operating costs 
needed to be decreased  
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the Tanzanian government and the IMF staff.7 In the second review for instance, it becomes 
clear that some donors were delaying the process of the elimination of tax exemptions 
(country report 04/285:12). In the same review, the Tanzanian government underlines that 
donors requested higher expenditures, something which the IMF is opposed to (ibid:13). The 
relevance of this factor also becomes clear from a Tanzanian evaluation report, in which a 
strong emphasis is placed on the importance of harmonization of aid programmes 
(‘Tanzania’s experience in aid coordination, harmonization and alignment’ 2004).   
 A second important factor is the Multilateral Debt Initiative (MDRI), which is granted 
by the IMF to Tanzania during the fifth review. Obviously, good performance during other 
IMF programmes enhances the chances of receiving debt relief. Considering that the MDRI 
mentioned above consists of a debt relief of 336 million US dollars, this clearly represents an 
extra incentive for high compliance.        
 A third factor for non-compliance, or delayed compliance, could be the lack of 
consequences of non-compliance. In Tanzania’s case, the IMF staff proved to be very flexible 
and understanding, especially if the delay was explained to be caused by longer 
consultations with stakeholders.  
4. Case study 2: Kenya 
4.1 Political background and relations with the Fund 
The Kenya African National Union (KANU) has been the ruling party from the first elections 
for African representatives in the British government, until 2002. Between 1963 and 1992, 
Kenya was officially a one-party state, until pressures from donors led to the establishment 
of multiparty elections in 1992 (Grosh and Orvis 1996: 51). Nevertheless, the KANU 
remained in power until the elections of 2002, which were won by the National Alliance of 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a coalition of two political parties. Between 2002 and 2007, the 
period in which the PRGF loan of this analysis was provided, the government was formed by 
the NARC for the first time.  Generally, the political parties in Kenya are considered to be 
institutionally weak as a result of poor societal linkages, a lack of effective programmes and 
a lack of a clear ideology or vision (Mwangi 2008: 269). This results in a competition between 
the political parties, based mainly on ethnocentric feelings (ibid. ). Furthermore, at least until 
                                                          
7
 Country report 05/58:44, country report 04/285:10, country report 05/181: 17, country report 05/291:14, 
country report 07/138:5 
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2008, corruption played a significant role in both party and general elections. Campaign 
funds were raised through government expenditures that were channeled through fictitious 
companies, such as Anglo-Leasing (ibid.:276).       
 Kenya joined the IMF in 1964, shortly after the country gained independence from 
Britain in 1963. Previous to the PRGF arrangement that is analysed here, Kenya was involved 
in four earlier arrangements with the IMF. These involved three ESAF programmes and one 
PRGF programme. While the first two programmes were relatively successful, in terms of 
their nearly full disbursement, the last two loans were less successful, considering that only 
20% of the loans were disbursed. This implies that the Kenyan authorities were not very 
successful in terms of implementing the reform policies as required by the IMF.  
4.2 The PRGF arrangement 2003-2007 
In November 2003, Kenya requested a  new loan of 175 million SDR under the PRGF 
arrangement. The loan is requested to support the implementation of a range of structural 
reforms  that will enable the government to attain its poverty reduction objectives. 
Furthermore, the poverty reduction strategy designed by the Kenyan government required 
an increase in donor funds. The authorities expect that the combination of policy reforms, 
improvements in governance and a coherent poverty reduction programme supported by 
the IMF, will help to attract sufficient donor assistance (country report 03/399:5).  
Table 2:  
Review # of spc # of spc met # of sbm # of sbm 
met 
        qpc 
1)December 
2004 
    7   Two not met 
2)March 2007     6   Two not met 
3)November 
2007 
    9   Two not met 
      
All            18             8 22             10  
 
 
     
 
Table 2 above was compiled in the same way as table 1, using information from tables in the 
appendices of the PRGF reviews of Kenya. It clearly exhibits some differences with the table 
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of Tanzania. Not only does Kenya perform structurally worse in terms of compliance, it also 
appears immediately that Kenya only concluded three reviews instead of six. This last point 
is especially interesting, because Kenya did draw almost the full amount of the loan: 150 
million of the 175 that it was entitled to. However, before discussing the reasons for this 
occurrence and the implications it could have, the following section first summarises the 
main findings regarding the type of conditionality and the extent of compliance.  
4.2.1 Type of conditions 
Structural conditionality for Kenya included measures in the area of governance, financial 
sector reform , fiscal issues and private sector development, with a strong focus on 
governance. Quantitative conditionality concerns the non-accumulation of arrears, a 
maximum amount spent on government wages, no newly contracted debt by the 
government or the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and maximum changes in reserve money 
and net foreign assets. Of the ten structural performance criteria that were not met, four 
were in the area of financial sector reform8, three in the area of governance9, and the 
remaining three concerned fiscal issues.10      
 Quantitative performance criteria that were not observed are: the limiting of 
contracting non-concessional long term external debt (once), the maximum change in 
reserve money of the CBK  (in two of the three reviews) and the non-accumulation of 
external arrears (in all three reviews). The structural benchmarks that were not met, were 
more or less evenly spread among all areas, no pattern could be distinguished. 
 Although Kenya clearly has a lower overall level of compliance, it did implement most 
of the measures required by the structural performance criteria, however later than 
planned. Moreover, they sometimes adjusted the measure from the initial agreement. An 
example is the wealth declarations of public officials, to which the public only gets restricted 
access instead of open access. A difference between the conditionality for Kenya and 
Tanzania is that some of the missed structural performance criteria were changed into prior 
                                                          
8
 Specifically: Submission to parliament of a banking act amendment bill; no imposition of controls by the 
government on the determination by commercial bank fees, charges or interest rates (twice); Submit to cabinet 
for approval a strategy to initiate the sale of GoK and NSSF’s share in NBK  
9
 Specifically: Complete verification of the asset declarations of ministers and senior officials; Complete asset 
declaration of ministers, permanent secretaries and heads of state bodies; Issuances of new guidelines for 
wage arbitration by the Industrial Court 
10
 Specifically: completion of an audit on the financial position of the National Social Security Fund;  Finalize an 
audit of the stock of pending bills; make the Public Procurement Oversight Authority fully operational  
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actions for Kenya. A prior action implies that these actions have to be taken before the 
programme can be continued. Also remarkable is the fact that Kenya manages to defer from 
the same quantitative performance criterion twice or even three times. This will be 
discussed more in depth later.  
4.2.2 Explanations for non-observance and the reaction of the IMF 
Unlike Tanzania, the Kenyan government does not provide explicit explanations for the non-
observance of each separate structural performance criterion. Instead, the Kenyan 
authorities describe the corrective measures they are taking to fulfill the requirements later 
(country report 09/225: 41, country report 09/137: 58, country report: 09/18:7). In the first 
review, they also provide a very general explanation:  ‘progress in implementing some key 
economic reforms has been impeded by the large amount of time devoted to constitutional 
reform, capacity constraints in key ministries and the slow resumption of donor budgetary 
assistance’ (country report 09/225: 43).         
 The non-observance of one quantitative performance criterion that is specifically 
explained by the Kenyan authorities is the non-accumulation of external arrears. This 
criterion has been breached in all reviews because of ‘a suspension of payments due to an 
audit of all central government contracts of commercial external debt’ (country report 
09/225:41). This audit was caused by the Anglo-Leasing scandal, leading to disputes about 
the necessity to pay a number of specific contracts that were considered fraudulent.  
 Looking at the reaction of the IMF staff, this does not show any serious concerns 
about the low rate of compliance. The IMF staff simply describes the performance criteria 
that have not been met and the remedial arrangements that are set up to correct this. 
Despite the low level of compliance, they support completion of the review and extension of 
the programme (country report 09/137: 4).  
4.2.3 Other explanatory factors        
Although it is not put forward as a reason for non-compliance, it becomes clear that 
privatization remains a controversial issue among the Kenyan public and its parliamentarians 
(country report 09/225:17). While the Kenyan government assures the IMF that it is 
committed to privatization and enterprise reform, it also explains that parliamentary 
support needs to be built for the reforms to take place. With respect to the privatization of 
public banks, the Kenyan authorities are especially careful, indicating ‘that sales of banks to 
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multinationals reduced banking service penetration to rural communities and disadvantaged 
groups’ (ibid: 18). This suggests that the Kenyan government does not actually want to 
implement these measures and thereby points to a lack of ownership about the IMF 
programme as a reason for non-compliance.       
 In addition, and similar to Tanzania, the factor of debt relief can also be found to play 
a role in the level of compliance in Kenya’s case. While Kenya was not eligible for the HIPC or 
MDRI, involvement in the PRGF enabled them to attain debt rescheduling from the Paris 
Club. This point comes up in the second review (country report 09/137:23). Since this 
concerns an amount of 402 million US dollar, this obviously represents an incentive to 
request a PRGF.          
 Finally, the consequences of non-compliance are likely to play a role. In the case of 
Kenya, it is apparent that non-compliance can have consequences: the completion of  first 
review of the PRGF arrangement of Kenya was delayed because a structural benchmark was 
not met. This is remarkable, considering that usually non-compliance with a structural 
benchmark is less important than non-compliance with a structural performance criterion, 
but in this case the non-observance of a structural performance criterion was not a problem 
for completion of the review, while the structural benchmark was. The problem here is thus 
that because the IMF is inconsistent in the application of its own rules, it becomes easier to 
not comply with all of them. This way, the IMF allows to stay involved in a PRGF 
arrangement as long as some steps in the right direction are observed. In fact, the IMF even 
approves an augmentation of the loan, because of an increase in oil prices and drought. This 
way the Kenyan authorities manage to bend the rules as is most suitable to them and reduce 
the costs of completing the first review later: in the end they still receive an amount of 50 
million SDR over the first year.        
 Similarly, the second review is also delayed, and completed almost two years after 
the second review. It is remarkable that the IMF staff does not explicitly comment on this, 
the only reason mentioned for the delay by the IMF staff is the existence of governance 
concerns (country report 09/137:20). This time the Kenyan authorities request a reduction in 
access and extension of the arrangement, both of which are granted by the IMF. Again, the 
Kenyan government appears to be able to bend the rules as is most suitable for them. In the 
end this means that they managed to obtain 150 million SDR (85% of the approved amount 
of 175 million SDR), even though only three of the six required reviews were completed.  
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5. Discussion  
Returning to the research question again, what did this qualitative analysis reveal about the 
reasons for non-compliance with conditions in PRGF programmes? In the comparison of the 
two cases, some factors stand out. Firstly, as was already discussed before, the reviews show 
that one of the most important reasons for non-compliance is a longer discussion with 
stakeholders (Tanzania) or more strongly, the failure to achieve consensus within the 
government and parliament on the measures required to be taken. Kenya in particular, 
makes it very clear that for instance the privatization of state-owned companies, is still a 
very controversial issue in the public opinion and in parliament. This could imply that the 
Kenyan government does not actually want to implement such measures, but has agreed 
with them in order to obtain the loan. In this respect, it is also important to take into 
account the domestic political situation. Tanzania’s government has to deal with a weaker 
opposition than Kenya. In addition, the Kenyan government is brand new and might want to 
prove that it does not take every advice the IMF provides. The Tanzanian government on the 
other hand, also seems less opposed to the reform measures, considering the fact that they 
opt for a PSI after the completion of the PRGF. This implies that they continue their reform 
measures in cooperation with the IMF, without receiving any loans. Another factor that 
suggests they are less opposed to IMF reforms, is the fact that they opt for a low access loan, 
meaning they do not receive much money in exchange for the implementation of reforms.
 The whole discussion above, relates to the willingness of the government to comply 
with conditionality and more generally to the literature on the importance of ownership. 
This concept proves to be a very relevant issue. In the Kenya case, it became evident that 
some laws that were controversial were eventually implemented, but were not followed in 
practice. In such a case, compliance with conditionality is a farce. One could argue that 
Tanzania is already in a process of socialization as described by Checkel. Tanzania seems to 
be willing to embed liberal economic principles in its policies, whereas Kenya remains 
strongly opposed to these principles.        
 This argument about ownership is also supported by documents from the borrowing 
countries themselves. The IMF conditions for Tanzania’s loan were reflected in later policy 
documents and reports, such as the new income tax law on the website of Tanzania’s 
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ministry of finance11 and a corruption evaluation report from the department of Research, 
Control and Statistics (‘The incidences of corruption in the land sector’ 2005). For Kenya on 
the other hand, the IMF reforms were not clearly exhibited in later policy documents. In the 
‘Kenya Vision 2030’ (2007) for example, the main Kenyan planning strategy document, the 
privatization of state-owned firms or the fight against corruption is not mentioned at all. This 
is quite remarkable, since these were two main issues in the IMF conditionality for Kenya’s 
PRGF loan.            
 A second point which becomes very clear, is the importance of donors. Both 
countries explicitly state  that they need the approval of the IMF to obtain more donor 
funds. However, in the case of Tanzania it also becomes apparent how much influence 
donors can have on the decision-making process as well as on the allocation of additional 
funds. One specific case even suggested that donors had delayed the implementation of a 
new tax exemption law in Tanzania. This way they also were a factor in non-compliance. 
Again, this point also becomes evident from a Tanzanian evaluation report (‘Tanzania’s 
experience in aid coordination, harmonization and alignment’ 2004).   
 A third point concerns the granting of debt relief. While Tanzania, manages to attain 
cancellation of a large part of its outstanding debt, under both the HIPC and MDRI 
programmes, Kenya uses the PRGF programme to reschedule its debt with the Paris club. 
 These latter two points can be related to the literature on ‘catalytic effects ’ that was 
briefly discussed in the literature review. The difference is that most of this literature 
focuses on the catalytic effects with respect to investment flows, while the reviews show 
that these countries focus more on increased aid grants and debt relief. This is meaningful, 
since it reveals how strongly the PRGF programmes are related to aid dependency, instead 
of private capital as the IMF would probably prefer.  Furthermore, the importance that both 
countries attribute to additional donor funds and debt relief, means that these two factors 
might represent larger benefits than the value of the IMF loan itself.    
 Finally, the fact that non-compliance does not always have consequences for the 
continuation of a programme is likely to be a significant factor. The case of Kenya exhibited 
that the Kenyan authorities managed to renegotiate the programme more than once and 
that the IMF is not consistent in the enforcement of its own rules. Knowing this, a 
                                                          
11
See:  http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39&Itemid=54 
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government can consider which measures it wants to implement to keep the programme 
running, while defaulting or delaying on other ones.       
So how does the above discussion relate to the general debate between rationalist and 
constructivist arguments? First of all, the relevance of rationalist theories becomes apparent 
from the importance of costs and benefits related to compliance. Higher aid flows and more 
debt relief clearly represent benefits of the involvement in an IMF programme. Also, the lack 
of strict consequences for non-compliance represent low costs for countries that do not 
comply. What is interesting with respect to the first observation though, is that these 
benefits are not always directly related to the extent of compliance itself. For debt relief in 
particular, it can be enough to be involved in an IMF programme, regardless the level of 
compliance. Donor funds seem to be more responsive to the level of compliance, 
considering the fact that Kenya does receive less donor funding than Tanzania.    
 The importance of a constructivist perspective becomes apparent in the process of 
socialization that can be distinguished in the case of Tanzania. It seems to be the case that 
the level of ownership is larger in Tanzania than in Kenya, or at least that the level of 
opposition to reforms is lower in Tanzania. This way, one could argue that the constructivist 
perspective explains why compliance for Tanzania is higher than for Kenya, while the 
rationalist perspective explains how this is possible. While the first points out factors that 
explain why Tanzania chooses to comply and Kenya does not, the latter underscores how 
these differences in compliance are facilitated. Furthermore, the constructivist perspective 
identifies political preferences as a main determinant for compliance, while the rationalist 
perspective focuses on the costs and benefits that are determined by these preferences. If a 
government’s political preferences differ substantially from those of the reform agenda, the 
(nonmaterial) costs of compliance tend to be higher than the benefits. Finally, the costs of 
non-compliance are not high enough to punish low compliance, while benefits can be 
obtained without full compliance.  
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Conclusion  
Emerging from the discussion on the impact and effectiveness of IMF lending programs, this 
thesis showed what a qualitative analysis reveals about the reasons for non-compliance with 
conditionality in PRGF programmes. It started with a description of the general debate on 
compliance between rationalist and constructivist scholars, of which the importance of 
domestic politics became clear. In contrast to most existing studies, this paper took a 
qualitative approach, using case studies and the method of controlled comparison. Factors 
like the domestic political situation, donor funds, debt relief and the lack of consequences 
for non-compliance are found to play an important role in the extent of compliance as well 
as the decision to get involved in an IMF programme. The difference in compliance between 
Tanzania and Kenya is traced to the extent of ownership that both countries reveal. In this 
respect, the concept of socialization as argued by Checkel proved relevant. With respect to 
the general rationalist-constructivist debate, this paper argues that constructivist arguments 
are more relevant at explaining why countries do not comply, while rationalist arguments 
put forward the framework that makes non-compliance possible. This is consistent with the 
view of other scholars that both approaches are complementary to each other, rather than 
mutually exclusive.           
 What do these results imply? From a pure functional point of view, this study shows 
that higher benefits from compliance, as well as higher costs for non-compliance, are 
needed to enforce compliance with conditionality. However, this paper also provided some 
examples where compliance did not mean enforcement of a specific reform. In the case of 
Kenya, a conditionality was complied with on paper, but in practice the measures were not 
implemented. In such cases, the importance of ownership comes back into the discussion. If 
programmes that are not sufficiently owned by the borrowing government are carried out 
anyway, conditionality does not prevent countries to defer from the structural reforms. 
Therefore, it might be useful to call into question the aim of the IMF to spread and impose 
specific liberal economic principles among all its members. Not only because the uniform 
applicability of these principles is contested, but also because evidence shows that it is not 
possible to enforce such reforms upon countries that have other preferences.  
 To conclude, some suggestions for further research are appropriate. First of all, more 
qualitative research is needed to test for the relevance of qualitative variables such as 
ownership and donor influence. Secondly, the (lack of) consequences for non-compliance 
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needs to be verified with other cases in order to determine the possible impact this has on 
the extent of non-compliance. Finally, in light of the increase in lending programmes to 
developed countries due to the economic crisis,  it would be interesting to investigate 
whether there are differences in the extent of compliance between different IMF 
programmes.  
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